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PROCESSING PLEADINGS AND THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF PREJUDGMENT
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski*
INTRODUCTION
Systems of civil pleading inevitably strike a balance between open
access to the courts and the costs of the civil justice system.' Adding
complexity to the pleading process raises the costs of bringing a law-
suit, but easy access to the courts and the discovery process can be
costly to defendants. Much of the ongoing debate about the wisdom
of the Supreme Court's decisions in Ashcroft v. Iqbal2 and Bell Atlan-
tic Corp. v. Twombly3 arises because the Court appears to have struck
a new balance between plaintiff access and litigation cost. 4 Notice
pleading allows a plaintiff to use the tools of discovery to investigate a
claim fully before facing a dispositive motion to dismiss. The new
pleading requirements force plaintiffs to articulate a plausible basis
for their claims, even before they can use discovery to investigate
them. As the Court proclaimed, "[O]nly a complaint that states a
plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." 5 Determining
whether a claim is plausible without discovery expresses enormous
faith in the "experience and common sense" of the federal judiciary. 6
In articulating the new system of heightened pleading, the Supreme
Court might have saddled federal judges with a job that they cannot
reasonably be expected to perform. The new pleading standard that
the Court has articulated forces judges to rely on their first impres-
sions of a lawsuit. Judges must imagine the course of the lawsuit with-
out knowing what facts discovery will uncover. Maintaining a fair and
just system requires that judges fill in the blank spaces of the lawsuit
* Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
1. See Jeffrey Rachlinski, Why Heightened Pleading-Why Now?, 114 PENN. STr. L. REV. 1247,
1248 (2009) ("All systems of civil pleading must . . . strike a balance between open access to the
courts and the costs of the civil justice system.").
2. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
3. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
4. See Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 Micai. L. REV. 53, 64 (2010) ("The
reason why the Supreme Court has pushed this change seems fairly obvious: the Court is con-
cerned with high discovery costs.").
5. lqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
6. Id. at 1940 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
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consistently across judges and cases. Federal judges, however, like all
decision makers, have limited cognitive abilities. Forming reliable
first impressions might well exceed the cognitive abilities that judges
possess.
In this Article, I review some of the evidence that I, along with
some of my colleagues, have produced on judicial decision making to
assess whether judges truly possess the kind of judgment that they
need to implement the new pleading standard with rigor and reliabil-
ity. In brief, I believe that they do not. Although federal judges are
well-trained, highly experienced professionals, the task of judging
cases on their pleadings in a way that does not depend on unreliable
factors that are easily subject to manipulation by the litigants is likely
unfounded.
"A timid judge . . . is . .. a lawless judge."7 Judges must act with
some measure of confidence in their own judgment. But the Court
now requires federal judges to act with a degree of confidence that
might not be justified. Judges must now assess cases with little more
than the pleadings, their own sense of how the world functions, and a
guess as to how a case might proceed. The growing body of research
on cognitive psychology and trial judges suggests that the new plead-
ing standard that this creates will have some unfortunate conse-
quences. Iqbal's requirement that judges decide at least some cases
on the pleadings alone encourages judges to rely too heavily on their
intuition, elevates the importance of potentially misleading pleading
practices, and encourages overconfidence among judges.
II. THE NEW PLEADING SYSTEM ENCOURAGES EXCESSIVE
RELIANCE ON JUDICIAL INTUITION
Understanding how judges will process cases under Iqbal and
Twombly requires understanding how judges make decisions. In a se-
ries of papers, Chris Guthrie, Andrew Wistrich, and I have developed
a model of how judges make decisions that arises from the research on
judgment and choice in ordinary adults.8 This research suggests that
7. Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 65 (1949) ("A timid judge, like a biased judge, is
intrinsically a lawless judge.").
8. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How
Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich,
Blinking]; Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86
CORNEal L. REv. 777 (2001) [hereinafter Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Inside the Judicial
Mind]; Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, The "Hidden Judiciary": An
Empirical Examination of Executive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477 (2009) [hereinafter Wis-
trich, Guthrie & Rachlinski, Hidden Judiciary]; Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disre-
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people tend to rely on two (somewhat) distinct systems of reasoning:
an intuitive system and a deliberative system.9
The intuitive system of judgment consists of cognitive processes that
produce rapid, confident judgments.'0 These processes are "auto-
matic, heuristic-based, and relatively undemanding of computational
capacity."" The intuitive system is sometimes called "System 1," be-
cause it is thought to be the primary way that the human brain
processes information.12 The intuitive system is essential for situa-
tions that require extremely rapid responses, such as reactions to dan-
ger. Slow, careful deliberation did not save any of our ancestors from
being eaten by predators-intuition did. As such, the intuitive system
produces judgments that "occur spontaneously and do not require or
consume much attention."' 3 The intuitive system is also heavily laden
with emotional content.14  Intuition produces confident judgments
meant to inspire quick action.
But the human brain also includes cognitive processes that can pro-
duce careful, logical, and reasoned judgments.15 These deliberative
processes are the ones that allow us to do mathematics and to reason
deductively.16 The deliberative system is sometimes called "System
2," because it does its work after System 1.17 Unlike intuitive
processes, deliberation requires cognitive effort.' 8  Deliberations are
also under great cognitive control and operate at a conscious level.' 9
garding, 153 U. PA. L. Riv. 1251 (2005) [hereinafter Wistrich, Guthrie & Rachlinski, Inadmissi-
ble Information].
9. See Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Blinking, supra note 8, at 6-9 (reviewing dual process
models of decision making).
10. See Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitu-
tion in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS ANI) BIAsEs: TiHE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDG-
MENT 49, 49 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002).
11. Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West, Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications
for the Rationality Debate?, in HEURISTICS AN) BIASES, supra note 10, at 421, 436.
12. See Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 10, at 51 ("System 1 is more primitive than System
2.").
13. Shane Frederick, Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 25, 26
(2005).
14. See Seymour Epstein & Rosemary Pacini, Some Basic Issues Regarding Dual-Process The-
ories from the Perspective of Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory, in DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN
SOCIAL PsyciiOLOGY 462, 469 (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999) ("[T]he experiential
system is emotionally driven.").
15. See Frederick, supra note 13, at 26 (describing a deliberative system as consisting of the
"execution of learned rules").
16. See Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 10, at 49 (describing a cognitive system that is
"deliberate, rule-governed, effortful, and slow").
17. See Stanovich & West, supra note 11, at 439 (describing the function of System 2 as neces-
sary to "override some of the automatic contextualization provided by System 1").
18. See id.
19. See id.
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These two systems of reasoning bear surprising resemblance to two
fundamental schools of thought about judges: realism and formalism.
Legal realists argue that judges develop hunches about how they will
decide cases and then reasoning follows. 2 0 This argument is closely
analogous to the arguments advanced by psychologist Jonathan Haidt,
who contends that many kinds of decisions are nothing more than ra-
tionalizations for intuitive judgments. 2 1 Formalists, however, contend
that judges are applying rules in a mechanical fashion.2 2 Chief Justice
John Roberts's description of judges as doing no more than calling
balls and strikes also reflects this position.23 The research on trial
judges suggests that both of these positions might be correct, although
each is also incomplete. 2 4 Judges have hunches about cases, but then
check these hunches against legal rules, deductive logic, and
deliberation. 25
To understand the nature of the problem with making judgments
too early, it is important to recognize that the intuitive system can be
surprisingly accurate. Malcolm Gladwell's book, Blink, illustrates the
point well with a powerful anecdote about the authenticity of an an-
cient Greek statue purchased by the Getty Museum in Los Angeles. 26
Gladwell describes how minerals experts who studied the statue con-
firmed its antiquity, while one art expert after another doubted its
provenance. 27 The art experts often could not quite articulate why
they thought that the statue was a fraud, but they just knew, some-
how.2 8 Even without being able to say why, and even though discern-
20. See Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in
Judicial Decision, 14 CORNEL.L L.Q. 274, 285 (1929).
21. Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach
to Moral Judgment, 108 PsyctioL. REv. 814, 815 (2001) ("[The reasoning process constructs
post hoc justifications, yet we experience the illusion of objective reasoning .... ).
22. See Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 Coi.um. L. REV. 1138, 1145-46
(1999) (describing legal formalism as a "descriptive theory of adjudication according to which (1)
the law is rationally determinate, and (2) judging is mechanical. It follows, moreover, from (1),
that (3) legal reasoning is autonomous, since the class of legal reasons suffices to justify a unique
outcome; no recourse to non-legal reasons is demanded or required.").
23. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) ("Judges
are like umpires. Umpires don't make the rules, they apply them.").
24. See Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Blinking, supra note 8, at 3 ("[N]either the formalists
nor the realists accurately describe the way judges make decisions, but . . . key insights from each
form the core of a more accurate model.").
25. See id. ("[J]udges generally make intuitive decisions but sometimes override their intuition
with deliberation.").
26. MAMco.M GLADWELL, BLINK: TiHE PowER OF THINKING WrIour THINKING 3-8 (2005)
(recounting the story).
27. See id. at 4-7.
28. See id. at 5-6.
416 [Vol. 60:413
PROCESSING PLEADINGS
ing the statue's authenticity was a complex process, experts could tell
it was a fake within a few seconds.29 This ability to make rapid, accu-
rate judgments is not limited to experts. A recent line of work in so-
cial psychology demonstrates that in some circumstances, people can
make surprisingly accurate assessments of people's personalities after
observing mere seconds of exposure.30 Snap judgments can be erro-
neous but they are not always inaccurate.
Despite being surprisingly accurate at times, intuitive judgments
have several basic problems as foundations for judicial decisions.
First, the intuitive system is faster than the deliberative system. The
judgments it produces enter the mind before deliberation. Intuition
can influence the deliberative process to the point where deliberation
is nothing more than window dressing. Second, intuitive systems can
operate at an unconscious level. The influence of intuition might thus
remain unnoticed and unexamined. Hence, if intuition is having an
undesirable effect on judgment, decision makers might be powerless
to combat its influence. Third, the deliberative system requires effort.
Relying on intuition poses little cognitive effort, whereas overriding
intuitive judgments requires some cognitive work. Because the intui-
tive system produces confident judgments, decision makers might fail
to recognize the need to undertake the cognitive effort needed to
override their first impressions.
Nobel Prize-winning psychologist Daniel Kahneman and economist
Shane Frederick explain the interplay between intuition and delibera-
tion well: "System 1 quickly proposes intuitive answers to judgment
problems as they arise, and System 2 monitors the quality of these
proposals, which it may endorse, correct, or override. The judgments
that are eventually expressed are called intuitive if they retain the hy-
pothesized initial proposal without much modification."3 1 To make
good judgments, trial judges must consider carefully whether to sup-
press the instinct about a case that their intuitive system produces.32
But perhaps judges already know this. Judges are highly exper-
ienced lawyers who have spent their careers reasoning by analogy and
parsing legal rules. By disposition or training, they might naturally
rely more on deliberation than intuition. To assess this, my colleagues
29. See id. at 8.
30. Peter Borkenau et al., Thin Slices of Behavior as Cues of Personality and Intelligence, 86 J.
PERSONALrIY & Soc. Psycioi. 599, 599-600 (2004) ("[I]t has become clear that very short
observations by strangers may be sufficient to obtain statistically significant . . . agreement for
judgments of personality.").
31. Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 10, at 51.
32. See Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Blinking, supra note 8, at 43 ("[Clogent legal judg-
ments call for deliberation.").
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and I have administered the "Cognitive Reflection Test" (CRT) to
judges to assess whether they naturally rely on intuitive judgment.33
Economist Shane Frederick developed the CRT as a simple demon-
stration of the dual-processing model.34 The CRT is a three-item test
designed to distinguish intuitive from deliberative processing. More
precisely, the CRT measures "cognitive reflection," which Frederick
describes as "the ability or disposition to resist reporting the response
that first comes to mind."35 The CRT appears in its entirety in Figure
1 below:
FIGURE 1: COGNITIVE REFLECTION TEST
(1) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the
ball. How much does the ball cost?
cents
(2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it
take 100 machines to make 100 widgets?
-minutes
(3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in
size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long
would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake?
days
Each of the three items in the CRT is designed to trigger an inaccu-
rate intuitive response. On the first question, the use of the $1.10 and
$1.00 as cues triggers the simple response of ten cents. If the ball costs
ten cents, however, and the bat costs one dollar more, the bat must
cost $1.10. Adding those two figures together, the total cost of the bat
and ball would be $1.20, not $1.10. The correct answer is five cents-
the ball costs five cents, the bat costs $1.05, and together they cost
$1.10. Similarly, the repetition of the number five three times and
then the number one hundred twice triggers the intuitive response of
one hundred in the second question. The answer is five, however, as
the one hundred machines each produces a widget five minutes later.
The use of the word "half" in the third problem triggers the idea that
the right answer is half of forty-eight, or twenty-four. But this is not
right, because if the patch of lily pads doubles each day and covers the
entire lake on the forty-eighth day, it must cover half the lake the day
33. Id. at 13-19 (reporting results).
34. See Frederick, supra note 13, at 26-28 (describing the CRT).
35. Id. at 35.
[Vol. 60:413418
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before. The key to answering correctly lies with knowing to suppress
the intuitive answer.36
The CRT illustrates the tension between the intuitive and delibera-
tive systems in three ways. First, although the questions are easy,
most people get most of them wrong. Across a number of studies,
Frederick found that people answer an average of 1.24 of the three
items correctly.37 Second, the intuitive answers (10 cents, 100 min-
utes, and 24 days) are the wrong answers that people most often se-
lect.38 Third, people who choose intuitive answers rate the questions
as easier than those who get the questions correct. For example, in
one study, people who chose the intuitive answer on the bat-and-ball
problem predicted that 92% of people would solve the problem cor-
rectly, while people who responded correctly predicted that only 62%
of people would do so. 3 9
Although Frederick's results demonstrate a widespread misplaced
reliance on intuitive judgment, some groups do well on the CRT. MIT
students scored an average of 2.18 on the CRT.40 Whether by predi-
lection or by training, MIT students have learned to resist the intuitive
response for problems of this sort. If judges are also so inclined, then
perhaps concern about prejudgment is misplaced. Through years of
experience with legal reasoning and detailed rules that sometimes lack
intuitive foundations, perhaps judges have become like the MIT stu-
dents and naturally suppress intuitive judgment.
In a series of studies, however, my colleagues and I have found that
judges perform much like others on the CRT. In a study of 252 Flor-
ida trial judges, for example, we found that judges scored an average
of 1.23 out of a possible 3.00 on the CRT.41 In another study, admin-
istrative law judges scored somewhat higher (1.33),42 and a group of
appellate judges at an ABA program scored much better (1.79).43 But
most judges produce results on the CRT that are within the range of
most college students at highly selective universities. 44 These results
36. Id. at 27 ("[T]heir solution is easily understood when explained, yet reaching the correct
answer often requires the suppression of an erroneous answer that springs 'impulsively' to
mind.").
37. Id. at 28-29.
38. Id. at 27.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 29.
41. Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Blinking, supra note 8, at 14.
42. Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Hidden Judiciary, supra note 8, at 1499.
43. These data have not previously been reported. They were collected from a group of
ninety-nine judges in attendance at the annual American Bar Association Appellate Judges Con-
ference in Orlando, Florida on November 19, 2009.
44. Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Blinking, supra note 8, at 15 tbl. 2.
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suggest that the judges performed comparably to other well-educated
adults. But judges do not suppress intuition in the way that MIT stu-
dents do.
Although the CRT is obviously not a test of legal reasoning, we
have found that results on the CRT correlate with reasoning in at least
some legal contexts. The principal example of this is that judges who
perform well on the CRT tend to do well on an evidential inference
problem that we have presented to numerous judges. Our problem is
based on the classic English case, Byrne v. Boadle:45
The plaintiff was passing by a warehouse owned by the defendant
when he was struck by a barrel, resulting in severe injuries. At the
time, the barrel was in the final stages of being hoisted from the
ground and loaded into the warehouse. The defendant's employees
are not sure how the barrel broke loose and fell, but they agree that
either the barrel was negligently secured or the rope was faulty.
Government safety inspectors conducted an investigation of the
warehouse and determined that in this warehouse: (1) when barrels
are negligently secured, there is a 90% chance that they will break
loose; (2) when barrels are safely secured, they break loose only 1%
of the time; (3) workers negligently secure barrels only 1 in 1,000
times.46
We then asked, "Given these facts, how likely is it that the barrel that
hit the plaintiff fell due to the negligence of one of the workers?" 47
The materials then asked the judges to answer by choosing one of four
probability ranges: 0-25%, 26-50%, 51-75%, or 76-100%.
When presented with a problem like this one, most judges rely on
their intuition-the accident sounds like it was the product of negli-
gence, so intuition would suggest negligence must have caused it.
Among a group of federal judges, only about 41% answered it cor-
rectly by selecting the low range as the actual probability that the acci-
dent was the result of negligence. 4 8 Many of the judges treated the
90% figure as the likelihood that the accident was the product of neg-
ligence, thereby converting the true meaning of the 90% statistic (the
likelihood of injury given negligence) into its inverse (the likelihood
of negligence given injury). A deductive approach reveals that the
actual probability that the defendant was negligent is only 8.3 %.49
45. Byrne v. Boadle, (1863) 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Ex. Ch.).
46. Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, supra note 8, at 808.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 809.
49. Because the defendant is negligent .1% of the time and is 90% likely to cause an injury
under these circumstances, the probability that a victim would be injured by the defendant's
negligence is .09% (and the probability that the defendant is negligent but causes no injury is
.01%). Because the defendant is not negligent 99.9% of the time and is 1% likely to cause an
[Vol. 60:413420
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Much like the CRT results, the most common wrong answer (also se-
lected by roughly 40% of the judges) was the intuitive response that
the accident was more than 75% likely to have been the product of
negligence.50
Iqbal represents a call for judges to rely on their intuition. Deciding
a case on the pleadings requires that judges make an assessment of
what they think is plausible based on an extremely limited set of infor-
mation. Doing so begs them to fill in the gaps and estimate what
would be learned with discovery using their best guess, based on intui-
tion and experience. Intuition is a powerful tool. But psychologists
have time and again demonstrated that it can be easily led astray.
Slow, careful, deliberative processes are the key to sound judgment,
not snap intuition.
To be sure, a judgment on the pleadings is not the same as a judg-
ment on the CRT. Iqbal does not require judges to make snap deci-
sions with little time to deliberate. But judging on the pleadings does
require judges to make some guesses about how the case will proceed
and to rely on their intuition more so than a judgment later in the case
might require. And Iqbal encourages judges to rely on their experi-
ence and intuitive abilities. The dual-process models of judgment sug-
gest that this is a mistake. Left to their own devices (as in the CRT),
most people will rely too heavily on their intuition. To the extent that
Iqbal further encourages intuition, it is probably an unfortunate
change.
III. HOW THE NEW PLEADING SYSTEM CAN FACILITATE
FAULTY JUDGMENT
Whatever else the new pleading system accomplishes, it encourages
lawyers to attend more carefully to their pleadings. Plaintiffs must
worry that their complaints will not survive a motion to dismiss, and
defendants can use their answers to set up such a motion. In our re-
search on judges, we have found several examples of contextual ma-
nipulations that can change how judges think about cases. While
these manipulations can become difficult for lawyers to use in strate-
gic and misleading ways as the case proceeds to trial, they will be
more available at the time of the pleadings. This Part provides two
injury under these circumstances, the probability that on any given occasion a victim would be
injured even though the defendant took reasonable care is 0.999% (and the probability that the
defendant is not negligent and causes no injury is 98.901%). As a result, the conditional
probability that the defendant is negligent given that the plaintiff is injured equals .090% divided
by 1.089%, or 8.3%.
50. Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, supra note 8, at 809.
2011] 421
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such examples of cognitive processes we have found that can be used
to tinker with pleadings in ways that might affect how judges fill in the
gaps to assess plausibility: anchoring and assessment of inadmissible
evidence.
A. Anchoring
When making numeric estimates, people commonly rely on numeric
starting points and adjust from them.5 ' This is a perfectly reasonable
strategy, as numeric starting points often provide useful information
as to the correct numeric value. For example, when determining what
one might pay for a new car, the sticker price at the dealership can
provide a good starting estimate. But because people generally do not
adjust sufficiently, 52 anchors can unduly influence intuitions about
value. Higher-priced items might draw the price paid up, whether or
not the higher price reflects better quality.53 Even irrelevant or ab-
surd anchors can affect judgment. 5 4  In the legal context, mock jury
studies have shown that plaintiffs' requests for damage awards can
have large effects on how jurors think about a case.55 Plaintiffs can
thus use the intuitive processes that anchoring produces to change
how juries think about cases.
But what about judges? In a series of studies, we have found that
anchors influence judges. In one study, we demonstrated that a de-
mand made at a settlement conference anchored judges' assessments
of the appropriate amount of damages to award. 56 We asked judges to
assign an appropriate compensatory damage award for a vignette
describing a civil case.57 The facts indicate that the plaintiff had suf-
fered injuries in a car accident caused by a negligent truck driver:
Imagine that you are presiding over an automobile accident case
in which the parties have agreed to a bench trial. The plaintiff is a
31-year-old male schoolteacher and the defendant is a large pack-
age-delivery service. The plaintiff was sideswiped by a truck driven
erratically by one of the defendant's drivers. As a result of the acci-
51. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Bi-
ases, 185 Sci. 1124, 1128 (1974) (explaining anchoring).
52. See id.
53. See DAN ARILY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: TiHE HIDDEN FoRcEzs THAT SHArE OUR
DECISIONs 30 (rev. ed. 2009) ("Anchoring influences all kinds of purchases.").
54. See id. at 28-30 (describing how MIT students' decisions as to how much to bid for a
consumer item were influenced by their social security numbers).
55. See Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, supra note 8, at 789-90 (re-
viewing mock jury studies).
56. Wistrich, Guthrie & Rachlinski, Inadmissible Information, supra note 8, at 1288-91
(describing the study and results).
57. See id. at 1289.
[Vol. 60:413422
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dent, the plaintiff broke three ribs and severely injured his right
arm. He spent a week in the hospital, and missed six weeks of work.
The injuries to his right arm were so severe as to require amputa-
tion. (He was right-handed.) 58
Half of the judges (in the control group) read that the plaintiff's law-
yer had told them at the settlement conference that the plaintiff "was
intent upon collecting a significant monetary payment." 59 The other
judges (the anchor group) learned that the plaintiff's lawyer had de-
manded $10 million.60 The $10 million anchor influenced the judges.6'
Judges in the control group awarded a mean amount of $808,000 and a
median amount of $700,000, while judges in the anchor group
awarded a much larger mean of $2,210,000 and median of $1 million. 62
A related study using nearly identical materials showed that
anchors can reduce how much a case seems worth to judges as well.
As compared to a control condition identical to that above, a condi-
tion in which judges were told that the plaintiff was willing to settle for
$175,000 produced much lower average awards. 63 In all versions, we
reminded the judges that the discussions during settlement do not
constitute admissible evidence; judges know that they should ignore
this information. And yet the anchors changed how they thought
about the case.
In another study, we tested whether an anchor that arose in a mo-
tion to dismiss would also affect judges' damage awards. 64 In this
study, the judges assessed a similar fact pattern to that described
above.65 We asked half of the judges to make a compensatory damage
award.66 We asked the other half the same question, but only after
they had to rule on a motion to dismiss the case for failing to meet the
jurisdictional minimum of $75,000 (the case was in federal court, and
the judges were federal judges).67 All but two of the judges dismissed
the motion, as the damages easily exceeded $75,000.68 Nonetheless,
the $75,000 jurisdictional minimum affected judges.69 Those judges
58. Id. at 1332.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1289.
62. Id. at 1290, tbl. 3.
63. See id. at 1288-90.
64. See Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, supra note 8, at 790-92
(describing the study).
65. See id. at 790.
66. Id. at 790-91.
67. See id. at 791.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 792.
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who had not ruled on the motion awarded the plaintiff an average of
$1,249,000 (and a median of $1 million), while those judges who ruled
on the motion to dismiss awarded the plaintiff an average of $882,000
(and a median of $882,000).70
In another study, we demonstrated that an anchor can influence
judges even when it is a completely implausible source of informa-
tion.71 In that study, we presented judges with a case of racial discrim-
ination in the workplace, in which the only available damages arose
from the emotional distress of the discrimination. 7 2 The plaintiff, a
Mexican immigrant, had been fired from her job after complaining
that her supervisor repeatedly used a series of racial epithets meant to
humiliate her in front of her co-workers and even her daughter.73 The
materials indicated that the plaintiff quickly obtained another job and
hence her damages were limited to an emotional distress claim. 74 In
the control condition, which exposed judges to no numeric estimate of
any kind for the award, judges provided a median award of $6,250.75
In another version, however, we added a single sentence indicating
that the plaintiff testified that she had seen a "court TV Show" in
which a plaintiff received a $415,300 award in a case similar to hers,
and the median award rose to $50,000.76
These studies suggest that numeric anchors have a powerful influ-
ence on judges' judgment. The last study in particular shows how
anchors can completely change judges' perspectives on a case. For
many judges in that study, the anchor converted a case that seemed to
be worth little or nothing into a serious, five-figure claim. This effect
occurs even though the anchor bears no relation to the magnitude of
the claim even when the judges know that they are supposed to ignore
the anchor. These studies show that anchors can both increase and
decrease the perceived value of a case.
As the case proceeds, the effect of anchors likely diminishes for two
reasons. First, factual inquiries will uncover a multitude of different
numeric values that are relevant to the case. Judges will have several
estimates of the case's value, diminishing the potential for any single
anchor to influence their judgment. Second, it becomes difficult for
either party to present implausible anchors without risking being pe-
70. Id. at 791-92.
71. See Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Hidden Judiciary, supra note 8, at 1501-06 (describing
the study).
72. See id. at 1502-03.
73. Id. at 1502.
74. See id. at 1502-03.
75. See id. at 1504, tbl. 2a.
76. Id. at 1503-04.
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nalized for doing so. Even though extreme anchors affect judges, a
lawyer who presents an implausible anchor risks harming his or her
credibility with the court and maybe even risks a Rule 11 sanction.
But at the pleadings stage, the prayer for relief presents a nearly
boundless opportunity for a plaintiff to try to influence the judge with
an anchor. As the case proceeds, the amount that the plaintiff re-
quests in a complaint will have a diminishing influence. But because
the new pleading system allows for judgment on the pleadings, more
gamesmanship might occur at the pleadings stage. Anchoring repre-
sents one mechanism litigants can use to try to influence how judges
will react to a motion to dismiss at the pleadings stage.
B. Judges' Reactions to Inadmissible Evidence
The new pleading system requires that lawyers plead claims that
seem plausible, but one way of making claims seem plausible is to
refer to inadmissible testimony. In a series of studies, we have found
that judges are vulnerable to the influence of evidence that they con-
sider inadmissible.77 That is, even when judges rule testimony to be
inadmissible, they nevertheless might be influenced by it. This is not
surprising, given the cognitive difficulties with such tasks. Even learn-
ing something that turns out later not to be true creates beliefs and
inferences that persist.78 But the influence of inadmissible informa-
tion affords litigants an opportunity to craft pleadings in a way that
influences how judges think about their case.
One of our studies illustrates the point well. We tested whether
judges can disregard a prior criminal conviction that is presumptively
inadmissible under the rules of evidence.79 Rule 609 of the Federal
Rules and some state rules impose various limits on the admissibility
of prior criminal convictions.80 When more than ten years have
elapsed since the completion of a sentence resulting from a conviction,
the evidence of the conviction is inadmissible unless "the probative
value of the conviction [is] supported by specific facts and circum-
stances [and] substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect." 8' This
"time limit" rule is an intrinsic exclusionary rule that limits the admis-
sibility of the prior criminal conviction on the grounds that it might
prejudice the fact finder.
77. See Wistrich, Guthrie & Rachlinski, Inadmissible Information, supra note 8, at 1251.
78. See id. at 1267-70 (reviewing the literature on belief perseverance).
79. See id. at 1305-07 (describing the study).
80. F~oo. R. Evio. 609. We studied this in the federal system and in Arizona, which has the
identical rule. ARIz. R. Evio. 609(b).
81. FED. R. Evil). 609.
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To assess whether judges might be influenced by evidence of a prior
criminal conviction, we created and administered a scenario entitled
"Assessment of Pain and Suffering Damages." 82 In this scenario, the
participating judges are told that they are presiding in a bench trial in
which the only issue is the appropriate damage award for pain and
suffering. The case is a products liability suit filed by an individual
plaintiff against a lawnmower manufacturer (for a group of judges in
Arizona) or a snowblower manufacturer (for a group of judges in
Minnesota).83 The materials describe the plaintiff as a single, thirty-
five-year-old automobile mechanic who was badly injured while oper-
ating the piece of machinery.84 The defendant admits that the injury
was caused by a manufacturing defect and disputes only the appropri-
ate amount of pain-and-suffering damages.85 The materials describe
the injury as involving a serious injury to the plaintiff's arm.8 6 The
materials state that the injured arm does not need to be amputated
but is likely to remain useless. 7 The materials describe the pain in
some detail and ask the judges for an appropriate damage award.88
Half of the judges, however, must first rule on the admissibility of a
past conviction. 89 The plaintiff "had been convicted of swindling
schemes in which he obtained the life savings of elderly retirees by
falsely promising them exorbitant rates of return, and then using their
money to pay his living expenses." 90 The materials note that the
plaintiff's most recent conviction had been fourteen years ago and
that he had spent two years in prison.9'
The judges who ruled that the prior criminal convictions were not
admissible awarded an average of 12% less in pain and suffering dam-
ages than did those judges who were not exposed to the plaintiff's
criminal history.92 Specifically, judges who had not learned of the
criminal conviction awarded an average of $778,000, whereas judges
who ruled that the criminal history was not admissible awarded an
average of $685,000.93
82. See Wistrich, Guthrie & Rachlinski, Inadmissible Information, supra note 8, at 1305-06
(describing the vignette), 1338-39 (presenting the full scenario).
83. Id. at 1305.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See id.
87. Id.
88. See id. at 1305-06.
89. See id. at 1306.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 1307, tbl. 4.
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In other studies, we found that judges were vulnerable to the influ-
ence of inadmissible evidence in a wide array of settings. Specifically,
judges were unable to ignore the following: inadmissible anchors re-
vealed during settlement discussions (as noted above in the discussion
of anchoring),94 information revealed during a privileged conversation
between an attorney and a client that badly undermined a plaintiff's
case,95 the past sexual history of a victim in a date-rape case,96 and
evidence rendered inadmissible due to a plea agreement.97
As with anchoring, inadmissible evidence begins to have less influ-
ence as the case proceeds. Lawyers must rely only on evidence that
can be admissible at trial to support or oppose summary judgment. At
trial itself, a jury might never be exposed to the inadmissible testi-
mony. But rules of evidence do not apply to the pleadings stage.
Both a plaintiff and a defendant are free to put in facts that will never
influence a decision maker at trial. Our studies suggest that this kind
of evidence is apt to influence judges' assessments of a case.
C. Judicial Overconfidence
The procedure Iqbal mandates assumes a degree of humility in
judges that likely exists in no professional decision maker. Imagine a
judge reads a complaint and quickly develops an intuition that the
storyline the plaintiff articulates is unlikely to be true. Before dis-
missing the case, the judge must be sure that the storyline is not just
unlikely, but implausible. In effect, the judge must weigh the degree
of confidence she has in her own beliefs about how the case will pro-
ceed. The idea that pleadings are only meant to provide notice pre-
cludes making this assessment, but Iqbal demands it. Judges-like
most adults-are not well calibrated and humble about their predic-
tions. Rather, they are highly confident in their abilities.
Psychologists have found that people tend to make judgments about
themselves, their abilities, and their beliefs that are "egocentric" or
"self-serving." People routinely estimate, for example, that they are
well above average on characteristics that are important to them, like
their health, the likely duration of their marriages, their driving abil-
ity, and so forth. 98
94. See id. at 1288-91.
95. See id. at 1296-98.
96. See id. at 1300-02.
97. See id. at 1309-11.
98. See Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, supra note 8, at 811-13 (re-
viewing the research on egocentric biases).
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We have repeatedly found that judges make similarly egocentric as-
sessments of their own abilities. In one demonstration of this effect,
we asked judges to compare themselves to their peers on three dimen-
sions: their ability to assess the credibility of a witness, their ability to
avoid bias, and their ability to facilitate settlements.99 With regard to
each, we asked the judges to place themselves in one of four quartiles:
the top 25%, the next 25%, the next-to-last 25%, and the bottom
25%.100 The judges provided incredibly self-serving interpretations of
their skills.o'0 With regard to assessing the credibility of witnesses,
nearly 85% of the judges placed themselves in the top half and not a
single judge placed herself in the bottom quartile.102 Similarly, 87%
stated that they were better than the median judge at facilitating set-
tlements. 03 And as to their capacity for avoiding bias in judging, all
but one judge in our group (a whopping 97.2%) indicated they were
better than the median judge.104 A similar study of federal magistrate
judges showed that 87% rated themselves as less likely to be over-
turned on appeal than the median judge. 05 Judges, like most profes-
sionals, believe that they perform better at their job than their peers.
Egocentric beliefs about abilities are actually a positive, on the
whole. Evidence of egocentric judgments shows that judges care
about the work that they do and try hard to perform their jobs well.
But it also holds dangers. Overconfidence in judgment can lead
judges to believe that they have more ability to predict the course of a
lawsuit than is actually the case.
The literature on overconfidence is replete with studies showing
that people overstate their ability to predict the future. Unfortu-
nately, Iqbal encourages this overconfidence. It feeds into the natural
tendency judges and other professionals will have to make overconfi-
dent judgments.
IV. CONCLUSION
Notice pleading and open discovery delay judgment. That is one of
the features that makes it so costly and likely one of the features that
induced the Supreme Court to direct the lower courts to scrutinize
99. Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Hidden Judiciary, supra note 8, at 1518-20.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1519.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, supra note 8, at 813-14. See
also Theodore Eisenberg, Differing Perceptions of Attorney Fees in Bankruptcy Cases, 72 WASh.
U. L.Q. 979, 983 (1994).
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pleadings. But pleadings are much more like the kind of hypothetical
questions that we have administered to judges than are summary judg-
ment motions. Our materials are fiction, written to see if judges will
use misleading decision-making strategies like relying excessively on
intuition. Pleadings are not supposed to be fiction, of course, and pen-
alties exist for listing factual allegations that are simply false. But
pleading is an art. Inadmissible testimony and numeric anchors of all
kinds are fair game. Notice pleading slows judgment and reduces the
influences of tricks and gamesmanship lawyers can play (at least rela-
tive to judgment on the pleadings). The move to heightened pleading
and plausibility assessments, by contrast, feeds the overconfidence
and vulnerabilities that judges have when making intuitive
misjudgments.
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